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A REVIEW of the consecutive opinions of any court is likely to
be a sad undertaking, sad for the reviewer and sad for the
reader of his review. A series of opinions by a group of judges,
taken consecutively and according to the "run of the mine," will
not be found to be filled with many nuggets of gold. At least, they
will not seem so to any single reader. His interest is restricted
within fairly definite boundaries, determined by his own past ex-
perience and study. What single reviewer will stay awake as he
thumbs the pages of cases listed under " Errors and Appeals," or
under "Patents" in the Federal Supplement, or under the con-
glomerate of titles such as Negligence, Workmen's Compensation,
Indians, Automobiles and Criminal Law? The fact that each and
every case had intense interest for the two litigants, for the attor-
neys who represented them, and for the judges as well, is not enough
to keep the reviewer awake; much less is his review likely to keep
others awake.
How different is the task of a reviewer who studies the work of a
single judge, further limiting himself to the opinions of that judge
in cases within the field of the reviewer's own interest and experi-
ence. And if the selected judge is a Mansfield, a Holmes, or a
Cardozo, the reviewer comes away with bags of rich ore, although
it may still be refractory in nature and his skill may be inadequate
to reduce its value into current literary coin.
The work of Cardozo in the field of contract law is found in a
few more than one hundred opinions rendered in the New York
Court of Appeals during a period of about eighteen years. It
cannot be said that he made any extensive changes in the exist-
ing law of contract. To state the facts of the cases, the decision,
and the reasoning of his opinion will not show the overthrow of
old doctrine or the establishment of new. Instead, it will show the
application of existing doctrines with wisdom and discretion; an
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application that does not leave those doctrines wholly unaffected,
but one that carries on their evolution as is reasonably required by
the new facts before the court. When Cardozo is through, the law
is not exactly as it was before; but there has been no sudden shift
or revolutionary change. This is judicial evolution - judicial leg-
islation, if you please, restricted, as Holmes once said, from " molar
to molecular motion" and of an " interstitial" character. No one
case, therefore, may be of exciting interest; and it can be given in-
terest in this article only by liberal quotation, showing Cardozo's
style, reasoning, and judicial method.
INDEFINITE CONTRACTS AND IMPLIED PROMISES
Cardozo's opinions on contract law demonstrate his instinct for
a justice that is human and practical. Himself a master of expres-
sion, both graceful and exact, he knows also how to understand and
interpret the language of contractors, graceless and inexact, ab-
breviated and elliptical though it be. There is clear genius in his
filling of gaps, his finding of promises by implication where none
was put into clear words, his discovery and enforcement of the di-
recting purpose for which a contract was made, not permitting that
purpose to fail by reason of vagueness in details.
Where an employee was promised a CC fair share of the profits"
in addition to a specified salary, Cardozo refused to agree with the
majority that the agreement failed for indefiniteness and uncer-
tainty, justifying a discharge without cause. True, the employee
cannot be given damages for failure to pay this" fair share "with-
out proving how much it is; but in any event he is entitled to his
agreed salary for the agreed period. He suggests, in addition, that
the plaintiff might be able to show that usage fixed a fair share at a
definite percentage.'
I Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, 233, I1 N. E. 822, 826 (z9x6).
It is not often that Cardozo must dissent in a contract case. It is others who
dissent, and not infrequently; for Cardozo is molding the law to justice, not apply-
ing literal rules and definitions though the heavens fall. Only rarely does he fail to
induce the assent of at least half of his brethren on the bench. Occasionally he writes
a concurring opinion; but the others concur in that, too.
Two similar cases are Von Reitzenstein v. Tomlinson, 249 N.Y. 6o, x62 N. E. 584
(i928), holding that a promise of "an appropriate percentage" of accruing benefits,
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A plaintiff ordered goods and the defendant accepted, both
agreeing that the price was $3.1o per box, but was to be " subject
to change pending tariff revision." A tariff bill was then pending
in Congress but was not passed until long after performance be-
came due. The defendant repudiated the contract on the ground
that the price was too indefinite for enforcement. The court held
the contract valid. It means either that if there is a change of
tariff, the bargain is off until a new price is agreed upon; or that if
there is a change of tariff before delivery the extra cost of importa-
tion is to be added to the price. In either case the defendant is
bound if, as here, no tariff change occurs. Cardozo thus writes:
"Read the privilege of change with inflexible adherence to its form,
and one turns it into nonsense. If the change of price, to be valid,
must be declared while revision is still pending, no change may be
permitted after the revision is accomplished, which is the very time
of all when a change will be essential. To read the reservation thus
is to rob it of its efficacy as an implement to be used in furtherance
of a business purpose. In the transactions of business life, sanity
of end and aim is at least a presumption, albeit subject to be re-
butted. The defendant like the plaintiff supposed that in signing
these documents it was doing something understood to be signifi-
while not itself enforceable, showed that the value of the services had not been liqui.
dated at the stated wages; and Cohen & Sons v. Lurie Woolen Co., 232 N. Y. 112,
114, 133 N. E. 370, 372 (1921), where the buyer was given the "privilege to confirm
more if the seller can get more." The court said: "We think the implication plain
that the buyer is to fix the quantity, subject only to the proviso that quantity shall
be limited by ability to supply. It is said the option does not state the time within
which election is to be announced. We think a reasonable time is a term implied by
law. It is said the option does not embody a statement of the price. We think a
' privilege to confirm more ' imports a privilege to confirm at the price of the initial
quantity."
In Sun P. & P. Ass'n v. Remington P. & P. Co., 235 N. Y. 338, 342, 139 N. E. 470
(1923), Cardozo holds, somewhat surprisingly, that a written agreement for the sale
of 16,ooo tons of newsprint was too uncertain for enforcement. The price was fixed
for the first four months. For the next twelve months, it was to be fixed by agree-
ment, for periods also to be agreed on, "said price in no event to be higher than the
contract price charged by the Canadian Export Paper Co. to the large consumers,"
Two judges dissented, finding this sufficiently definite for enforcement by the buyer
at the Export Company's price. Was Cardozo less moved to cure defects in the work
of the well-paid lawyers of two rich corporations? Of course, all paper actually de-
livered had been paid for.
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cant and serious. It not only accepted the plaintiff's order, but it
asked the plaintiff to confirm the terms of the acceptance, and fol-
lowed this with a cable of the order to its manufacturer abroad.
Was it all sound and fury, signifying nothing? "-
Just as promises that are indefinitely expressed can be made
clear by a liberal process of interpretation, so also can entire
promises be found by reading between the lines. Sometimes a
promise is implied for the purpose of maintaining an action for its
breach - a defendant's promise; sometimes it is implied for the
purpose of making it operate as a consideration, so as to sustain
an action on another promise. Where an agent expressly prom-
ised to serve for five years, the court was able to find an implied
promise by the principal to employ for five years. "The law, in
construing the common speech of men, is not so nice in its judg-
ments as the defendant's argument assumes. It does not look for
precise balance of phrase, promise matched against promise in
perfect equilibrium. It does not seek such qualities even in written
contracts, unless perhaps the most formal and deliberate, and
least of all does it seek them where the words are chosen by the
master under legal advice and accepted by the servant without the
aid of like instruction. There are times when reciprocal engage-
ments do not fit each other like the parts of an indented deed, and
yet the whole contract ...may be 'instinct with an obligation'
imperfectly expressed." a
If a promise by a principal can be implied for the purpose of
enforcing it, so also can a promise by the agent be implied in order
2 Outlet Embroidery Co. v. Derwent AMill, 254 N. Y. 179, 183, 172 N. E. 462,
463 (1930).
* Moran v. Standard Oil Co., 211 N. Y. 187, ,97, xo5 N.E. 217, 221 (1914). Cf.
Sundstrom v. State of New York, 2X3 N. Y. 68, xc6 N. E. 924 (19x4) (implied
promise by the state not to make the construction of a canal more expensive by per-
mitting leakage from a parallel canal, caused by lack of repair). But there is no im-
plied promise by a client to his attorney that he will not discontinue a suit. Andrews
v. Haas, 214 N. Y. 255, xo8 N. E. 423 (1915). The acceptance of an assignment of a
leasehold, "subject to" the landlord's claim for past rent, is not a promise to pay
that claim. Schwartz v. Cahill, 22o N. Y. 174, ii5 N. E. 451 (1917). The existence
of an entire contract between a parent corporation and its subsidiary will not be
found by implication from facts that do not dearly require it, when the contract so
found would be illegal. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N. Y. 84, 155 N. E. s8
(z926).
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to serve as a consideration for an express promise by the principal.
Lady Duff-Gordon promised her agent in writing that he should
have the exclusive privilege of marketing her fashion designs.
When sued for breach, she argued that the agent had made no
return promise. The court thus replies: "It is true that he does
not promise in so many words that he will use reasonable efforts
to place the defendant's indorsements and market her designs.
We think, however, that such a promise is fairly to be implied.
The law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the
precise word was the sovereign talisman, and every slip was fatal.
It takes a broader view today." '
THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION
Surely the doctrine of consideration is one of the" elementary"
doctrines of the common law, one that chiefly distinguishes the
.common law from its great rival, the civil law. Everyone knows
that an informal promise is never binding without consideration.
Everyone knows that in order to be sufficient "in the eye of the
law," the consideration must be a "detriment" to the promisee.
A great many know, too, that it must be a "legal detriment," not
just any old kind of detriment. The revered Holmes thought he
knew that consideration must be something that is requested and
bargained for by the promisor, and that is given by the promisee in
exchange for the promise. Did he not make the Massachusetts
Supreme Court say: "Of course the mere fact that the promisee
relies upon a promise, made without other consideration, does not
impart validity to what before was void." '
4 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 9oi ii8 N. E. 214 (1917).
To attain the came purpose, a promise by the plaintiff was found by implication in
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, x59 N. E.
173 (1927), discussed below.
5 Martin v. Meles, 179 Mass. 114, xi6, 6o N. E. 397, 398 (goi). Later, in Wis-
consin & M. Ry. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379, 386 (:9o3), holding that a tax exemption
law was not made unrepealable by the fact that a railroad had been built in reliance
on it, Holmes caused the United States Supreme Court to say: "But the other ele-
ments are that the promise and the detriment are the conventional inducements each
for the other. No matter what the actual motive may have been, by the expres3 or
implied terms of the supposed contract, the promise and the consideration must pur-
port to be the motive each for the other, in whole or at least in part. It is not enough
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In view of all these ancient principles and elementary knowledge,
it appears strange that the American Law Institute, in its Restate-
ment of the Law of Contracts, dogmatically asserts that many in-
formal promises are binding without consideration of any kind,'
that the sufficiency of consideration does not depend upon its
being either a detriment to the promisee or a benefit to the prom-
isor,' and that it is not required to move from the promisee or to
the promisor.' It is true that the Institute adopts Holmes' defi-
nition of consideration; ' but it does its best to reduce the other
requirements stated above to the scrap heap. It takes pains to
construct an express rule that, under some circumstances, action
by the promisee in reliance on the promise will make that promise
binding, though it was made without any consideration at all.'
How can a body of scholars and judges and lawyers dare to
make such dogmatic assertions! Partly, it may be, because of two
opinions by Cardozo. And yet, in neither of them does be purport
to abandon ancient principles or to make new law."1 He recognizes
growth and change in doctrine; but the statement (or is it Restate-
ment?) of new doctrine he leaves to others. His compass points
to his guiding star of good faith in promises and justice in meeting
expectations; and he holds to his course, laboring manfully to
make the shifting winds of doctrine and the waves of sentiment
aid him toward his goal.
In the earlier of these two cases,12 there was a written agreement,
that the promise induces the detriment or that the detriment induces the promise, if
the other half is wanting."
6 RESTATEMSENIT, CoNTRACTS (1932) § 85.
7 Id. at §8.
8 Id. at § 75 (2).
9 Id. at § 75.
10 Id. at § go.
1 Indeed, in McGovern v. City of New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923),
and in the De Cicco case, infra note 12, he quotes from Holmes with apparent ap-
proval.
12 De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N. Y. 431, xi7 N. E. S07 (i917). The transaction
in this case has sometimes been described as a " marriage settlement." But there was
no property conveyed, in trust or otherwise. There was merely a father's promise to
his prospective son-in-law to pay an annuity to his daughter, the prospective bride.
Possibly the father bargained with Count Gulinelli for the marriage; it is reasonably
clear that the marriage occurred in partial reliance on the promise; and it is certain
that the father meant to provide for the comfort and happiness of his daughter.
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in the Italian language, executed by the defendant Joseph
Schweizer and his wife Ernestine, and Count Oberto Gulinelli. It
recites that Miss Blanche Schweizer "is now affianced to and is
to be married to" the said Count. After this recital and nothing
more, it proceeds: "Now in consideration of all that is herein set
forth the said Joseph Schweizer promises and expressly agrees by
the present contract to pay annually to his said daughter Blanche,
during his own life and to send her, during her lifetime, the sum
of two thousand five hundred dollars." Joseph paid the annuity
for twelve years and in the instant case was sued for the next in-
stallment, both the Count and his wife having assigned to the
plaintiff De Cicco. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff.
Was there any consideration for the promise of Joseph
Schweizer? In the signed document, none is stated, other than
the recital of a fact, the fact that Blanche " is now affianced to and
is to be married to "the Count. This recital was true. The happy
pair were engaged; and the wedding day was set. It appears that
they were married just four days after Joseph made his promise.
Apparently, it was argued that the" marriage "was the considera-
tion; and the defendant urged its insufficiency on the ground that
the marriage was no more than the performance of an already exist-
ing legal duty.
Looking at the words of the document alone, it is hard to be-
lieve that Joseph Schweizer was bargaining for anything. From
our knowledge of certain international marriages, or from our
reading of novels, we may suspect that the Count was indeed driv-
ing a bargain with Joseph. The document states nothing of the
kind. Is it not unworthy of us to make the decision rest upon
such a suspicion with such a basis? From the words of the docu-
ment alone, it would be reasonable to believe that in making his
promise Joseph was motivated and induced by his love for his
daughter, his joy at her approaching marriage, and his desire to
provide for her support. None of these inducements just stated
would be a sufficient consideration at common law; they were not
and could not be matters of bargain. It may be that they would
be a sufficient causa, under the civil law, to support Joseph's
promise.
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The court, however, says that the trial judge was justified in
making the inference of a bargain. "Undoubtedly, the prospec-
tive marriage is not to be deemed a consideration for the promise
unless the parties have dealt with it on that footing. Nothing is
consideration that is not regarded as such by both parties. But
here the very formality of the agreement suggests a purpose to
affect the legal relations of the signers . . . . We cannot say that
the promise was not intended to control the conduct of those whom
it was designed to benefit. Certainly we cannot draw that infer-
ence as one of law." A sound conclusion, if the purpose is to en-
force a promise that was reasonably relied on; not so convincing,
if intended to show that Joseph was making a bargain.
Did the marriage in fact take place in reliance on Joseph's
promise? Cardozo recites the circumstances, and says that from
them "we may infer that at the time of the marriage the promise
was known to the bride as well as the husband, and that both
acted upon the faith of it." Again, he says: "That they neither
retracted nor delayed is certain. It is not to be expected that they
should lay bare all the motives and promptings, some avowed and
conscious, others perhaps half-conscious and inarticulate, which
swayed their conduct. It is enough that the natural consequence
of the defendant's promise was to induce them to put the thought
of rescission and delay aside." Surely, this is convincing. Does
it also lend support to the Law Institute?
But, finally, was the marriage anything more than the perform-
ance of an existing legal duty, both on the part of the Count who
was promisee and on the part of Blanche who was a donee bene-
ficiary? Not a duty owed by them to father Joseph; they are not
shown to have made any engagement with him to marry each other.
It was a contractual duty of each to the other. The promisee,
Count Gulinelli, was under a legal duty to Blanche, a third party,
albeit one to whom the money was to be paid, and who, equally
with the Count, acted in reliance on the promise. Many earlier
New York decisions had held that the performance by A of his
contract duty to B is not a sufficient consideration for a new
promise by C. Cardozo cites some of these decisions; he does not
express disapproval of them or deny the rule on which they de-
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pend. But he now brings Blanche, the named beneficiary, into
the picture. Her action, too, is bargained for, or is intended to be
induced, or at all events has been in fact induced. The Count is
under a duty to Blanche, and Blanche is under a duty to the Count;
but together they are under a duty to nobody. Together, they are
free to rescind. Neither one has threatened a wrongful breach;
and they are not blackmailing Joseph into a donation,' All this
is true, indeed. Can the Law Institute be blamed for observing
that almost as much can be said for practically all cases of per-
formance of a contract duty owed to a third person? '" The prom-
isee is always " free" to offer a rescission; and the third person
is always free to assent thereto. Together, they are always free.
To be sure, the consideration is not often marriage; and fre-
quently the third person is not an intended beneficiary of the
promise sought to be enforced.
No one can doubt the soundness of this decision. Cardozo's
opinion demonstrates its justice, cites and weighs critically the
literature of the topic involved, and lays a foundation for subse-
quent development away from any mechanical application of the
pre-existing duty rule.5
13 Cardozo says: "The distinction between a promise by A to B to induce him
not to break his contract with C, and a like promise to induce him not to join with
C in a voluntary rescission, is not a new one." Id. at 436, xi7 N. E. at 809. It is not
suggested in the opinion that Count Gulinelli was threatening to jilt Blanche, or even
that the idea of a mutual rescission had occurred to any of the parties involved. The
father might have been bargaining for the "marriage "; and marriage is an event
that makes both jilting and rescission impossible. But it seems clear that the father
was not consciously bargaining for either forbearance to jilt or forbearance to rescind.
14 " Consideration is not insufficient because of the fact . . . (d) that the party
giving the consideration is then bound by a contractual or quasi-contractual duty to
a third person to perform the act or forbearance given or promised as consideration."
RE TATEA ET, CONTRACTS (1932) § 84(d).
15 It was this De Cicco case that led directly to Cardozo's lectures and other
e.xtrajudicial writings on jurisprudence. The present writer published an article dis-
cussing Cardozo's opinion, entitled Does Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration
(1918) 27 YALx L. J. 362. In the following year, Cardozo hesitatingly accepted an in-
vitation to deliver the Storrs Lectures at the Yale Law School. These were published
under the title TnE NATuRE OF THE JUDICIAL PRocass. As orally delivered, they were
a triumph. As printed, they have become a classic.
Two other opinions by Cardozo discuss "moral obligation" as a reason for en-
forcement; but they involve statutory law and will not be reviewed at length here.
The performance by A of his existing contract duty to B is not a sufficient considera-
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Ten years after the De Cicco case, the much litigated problem
of charitable subscriptions was presented to the court."0 Mary
Johnston subscribed $5,000 to Allegheny College, payable after
her death, directing that the fund should be known as the Mary Y.
Johnston Fund and that its proceeds should be used to educate
students preparing for the ministry. She paid $i,ooo of the sum
while still alive; and the College accepted it. Later she gave notice
of revocation. After her death, the College sued for the balance of
$4,000 and was given judgment. Cardozo again discusses the doc-
trine of consideration and the offshoot therefrom called "promis-
sory estoppel."
The promise when first made was a promise of a gift for a spe-
cified purpose and was not then binding. It was held that it be-
came binding, in accordance with the promissory estoppel doctrine,
when the College received the part payment. Such receipt raised
the implication of a promise to use the fund as Mary had directed.
It was by reason of this receipt and implied promise that Mary be-
came bound to pay the balance of her subscription. Thus the rev-
ocable promise of the subscriber was turned into an enforceable
bilateral contract by applying the supposed doctrine of promissory
estoppel.
This case forms part of the judicial basis for the rule of the
American Law Institute stated in Section go of the Contracts
Restatement; but it goes further than does the rule stated there.
tion for a new promise by B to pay increased compensation. McGovern v. City of
New York, 234 N. Y. 377, 138 N. E. 26 (1923) (this remains true in spite of increased
costs due to war conditions); see RESTATEmE.T, Coim-crs (1932) § 76. Some
courts, however, hold otherwise. The New York court had to apply the state con-
stitution, which expressly forbade "extra compensation" to public contractors.
Four years later in Shaddock v. Schwartz, 246 N. Y. 288, x58 N. E. 872 (1927),
Cardozo must have felt some satisfaction in applying a statute that authorized a city
to pay claims that were morally but not legally due. After the lowest bidder had
erected a building, the city was enjoined from paying because of an irregularity in
the form of his bid. The city council thereupon voted to pay the contract price as
reasonable compensation. This recognition of a moral obligation by the council was
held to be valid. "The taxpayer insists that it does not supply the basis for a moral
obligation.... Its conception of good conscience is one of a justice unrelieved by
tenderness or charity.... We think the council was not limited in its etimate of
moral obligation to this Draconian severity."
26 Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Bank, 246 N. Y. 369, i5g N. E. 173
(1927).
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The Institute says that a promise may become enforceable by rea-
son of subsequent action or forbearance in reliance on the promise;
it must be action or forbearance of a "definite and substantial"
character; and the promisor must have had reason to foresee, when
he made the promise, that such action or forbearance would be in-
duced. The Institute does not use the expression "promissory
estoppel "; and it does not suggest that a bilateral contract can be
made by such a process. Nevertheless, the decision is consistent
with the rule of the Institute, and it is a reasonable step in the ad-
vancement of the law.
Various phrases in the opinion make it appear that Cardozo, like
innumerable others, thought that there is a" doctrine of considera-
tion" that is definite in form and that has come down to us from.
the past. He speaks of" the classic doctrine "; and after referring
to certain decisions based on estoppel, he adds: "So long as those
decisions stand, the question is not merely whether the enforce-
ment of a charitable subscription can be squared with the doctrine
of consideration in all its ancient rigor. The question may also be
whether it can be squared with the doctrine of consideration as
qualified by the doctrine of promissory estoppel."
The present writer has no criticism of the court's decision in this
case; nor with the ground of the decision that a gratuitous promise
to pay $5,000 may become binding by the donee's subsequent re-
ceipt of one-fifth of the sum and implied promise to maintain it as
a memorial fund. But he knows of no" classic doctrine," except as
one is quoted in the opinion from the works of Mr. Justice Holmes;
and that one is" classic "only because the man who composed and
repeated it is Holmes. The present writer knows of no doctrine
of consideration that ever was stated and applied with "ancient
rigor." Instead, the doctrine is one that was totally unknown in
early English law, one that started from nothing and was con-
structed case by case as reasons for enforcing informal promises
were found. The instant decision marks one more step in that
evolutionary process - in the development of a doctrine that is
modern rather than" classic " and that has always been character-
ized by flexibility rather than by "rigor." If the definition and
statement of doctrine by Holmes now bid fair to become classic and
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rigorous in application, it will be chiefly because the American
Law Institute has followed Holmes. But the Institute has also
fashioned its reliance doctrine in Section go, in addition to several
other classes of exceptions, expressly opening to the courts the pos-
sibility of enforcing promises without any consideration as " rig-
orously" defined.
CONDITIONS ExPREss AND I-PLIED
The process of interpretation and implication of promises in
order to determine whether or not a contract has been made is
often difficult, calling for the artistry of a Cardozo that justice may
not fail. As the chronological history of a contract transaction pro-
ceeds, the same process must continue, and often it is even more
difficult. What meaning and application are to be given to the
words of the parties? Granting that one made a promise and that
we know the performance that it requires, must he perform it
though the heavens fall? Was his promise made conditional, in
express terms, on some fact or event; and, if not, should not his
legal duty be held to be conditional by implication, or by construc-
tion of law, on grounds of equity and justice? For what reasons
should the court come to the aid of the foolish contractor, who
made a promise without taking care to qualify it by making it
conditional? Is it not his own folly that he did not look into the
future, observe the " march of nature," and protect himself against
the costs and hardships that afterwards will bear down upon
him? 17
If, on the other hand, a contractor, because of his wide experi-
ence and that of his astute counsel, does look into the future, and
qualifies his promise by making it conditional on so many factors
that the foolish promisee gets little for his money, with what liber-
ality shall the court use those flexible doctrines of waiver and
estoppel?
It takes wide reading and experience to realize how completely
17 Bentham observed that the law, by processes of interpretation and construc-
tion has "thus ... in every country ... supplied the shorts-ightedness of individ-
uals, by doing for them what they would have done for themseves, if their imagina-
tion had anticipated the march of nature." 3 WoRrs (1883) i9.
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our living law of contract depends upon the answers to questions
such as these; how much depends upon the honor and good will of
the contracting parties before taking them to court; and eventually
what qualities of reason and common sense and understanding are
required of the judge who must answer them." We may congratu-
late ourselves that our judges have these qualities in so high a
degree, and that among them there has been a Cardozo.
In pursuance of a contract for the sale of moving picture films,
an installment of the price amounting to $io,ooo became due on
December 24th. It was not paid on that day. With no additional
fact proved to justify his action, the seller repudiated the contract
and on December 26th sued for damages as for a total breach. It
is said that "in contracts of merchants, time is of the essence ";
ilso that time is always of the essence "at law," though not in
equity. Did this justify the seller's precipitate action? Not so,
held the court.'" It depends on what was to be done at the time in
question; and on why it was not done and on the injury resulting
and on other things. Cardozo puts it thus: " General statements
abound that, at law, time is always of the essence. For some pur-
poses this is still true. The vendor who fails to receive payment of
an instalment the very day that it is due may sue at once for the
price. But it does not follow that he may be equally precipitate
in his election to declare the contract at an end. That depends
upon the question whether the default is so substantial and im-
portant as in truth and in fairness to defeat the essential purpose
of the parties. Whatever the rule may once have been, this is the
test that is now prescribed by statute. The failure to make punc-
tual payment may be material or trivial according to the circum-
stances. We must know the cause of the default, the length of the
delay, the needs of the vendor, and the expectations of the vendee.
18 " You can always imply a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it?
It is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a clasq, or be-
cause of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours
upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative measurement and therefore not
capable of founding exact logical conclusions." Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897)
io HAv. L. REv. 457, 466.
19 Helgar Corp. v. Warner's Features, 222 N. Y. 449, ii9 N. E. 113 (i928). The
court applies the language of the Uniform Sales Act; and, of course, the New York
court is a court of equity as well as of common law.
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If the default is the result of accident or misfortune, if there is a
reasonable assurance that it will be promptly repaired, and if im-
mediate payment is not necessary to enable the vendor to proceed
with performance, there may be one conclusion. If the breach is
wilful, if there is no just ground to look for prompt reparation, if
the delay has been substantial, or if the needs of the vendor are
urgent so that continued performance is imperiled, in these and
in other circumstances, there may be another conclusion. Some-
times the conclusion will follow from all the circumstances as an
inference of law to be drawn by the judge; sometimes, as an in-
ference of fact to be drawn by the jury."
Look, on the other hand, at a road building contract in which
the State promised to pay a total of $355,000 in monthly install-
ments on engineer's estimates. The sum of $9,3oo became so pay-
able. The State tried to pay by issuing a warrant on a county
treasurer, who refused to honor it. The court held that the con-
tractor was justified in abandoning the contract, saying: "The
monthly payments were the fund from which the expenses of the
work were to be met. The contractor could not go on if the fund
was not supplied. The State may indeed have been entitled to a
reasonable opportunity to provide the necessary moneys after the
county treasurer's default. If it had sought such an opportunity
when informed of the dishonor of the drafts, the contractor might
have been in the wrong in adhering to a precipitate rescission. But
that was not the State's position." 2o
In a contract for the erection of a building for the total sum of
$77,000, the specifications required certain iron pipe to be of
"Reading" manufacture. A subcontractor used" Cohoes "pipe,
identical in quality. After completion, the final installment of the
price was refused; the architect refused his certificate and ordered
the substitution of "Reading" pipe. The trial court prevented
the contractor from proving that the change was trivial and di-
rected a verdict for the defendant. This was held error, even
though the duty to make the last payment was expressly condi-
tional upon the architect's certificate.2 ' "Substantial perform-
20 Anderson v. Hayes Const. Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 153 N. E. 28 (1926).
" Jacob and Youngs v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 129 N. E. 889 (1921). Three judges
dissented.
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ance "was enough in the" eye of the law." When we consider that
the architect ordered the tearing down of walls in a $77,ooo house
in order to replace" Cohoes "pipe with" Reading," it seems obvi-
ous that the court is doing justice. Of course on the new trial, the
defendant will have an opportunity to prove that there were other
reasons for refusing the certificate and the money.
Probably no other reported case can be found in which the ques-
tion of dependency of promises and of implied conditions of an
owner's duty to pay is discussed with as much enlightened intelli-
gence and charm of expression as we find here in Cardozo's opin-
ion: " Considerations partly of justice and partly of presumable
intention are to tell us whether this or that promise shall be placed
in one class or in another. The simple and the uniform will call
for different remedies from the multifarious and the intricate. The
margin of departure within the range of normal expectation upon a
sale of common chattels will vary from the margin to be expected
upon a contract for the construction of a mansion or a' skyscraper.'
There will be harshness sometimes and oppression in the impli-
cation of a condition when the thing upon which labor has been
expended is incapable of surrender because united to the land, and
equity and reason in the implication of a like condition when the
subject-matter, if defective, is in shape to be returned. From
the conclusion that promises may not be treated as dependent to the
extent of their uttermost minutiae without a sacrifice of justice,
the progress is a short one to the conclusion that they may not be
so treated without a perversion of intention. Intention not other-
wise revealed may be presumed to hold in contemplation the rea-
sonable and probable. If something else is in view, it must not be
left to implication. There will be no assumption of a purpose to
visit venial faults with oppressive retribution.
"Those who think more of symmetry and logic in the develop-
ment of legal rules than of practical adaptation to the attainment
of a just result will be troubled by a classification where the lines
of division are so wavering and blurred. Something, doubtless,
may be said on the score of consistency and certainty in favor of a
stricter standard. The courts have balanced such considerations
against those of equity and fairness, and found the latter to be the
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weightier. The decisions in this state commit us to the liberal view,
which is making its way, nowadays, in jurisdictions slow to wel-
come it. Where the line is to be drawn between the important and
the trivial cannot be settled by a formula. 'In the nature of the
case precise boundaries are impossible.' The same omission may
take on one aspect or another according to its setting. Substitu-
tion of equivalents may not have the same significance in fields of
art on the one side and in those of mere utility on the other. No-
where will change be tolerated, however, if it is so dominant or
pervasive as in any real or substantial measure to frustrate the
purpose of the contract. There is no general license to install
whatever, in the builder's judgment, may be regarded as 'just as
good.' The question is one of degree, to be answered, if there is
doubt, by the triers of the facts and, if the inferences are certain,
by the judges of the law. We must weigh the purpose to be served,
the desire to be gratified, the excuse for deviation from the letter,
the cruelty of enforced adherence. Then only can we tell whether
literal fulfilment is to be implied by law as a condition."
On the measure of the damages for the contractor's minor
breach, the opinion shows the same clear common sense. To
apply the usual rule measuring the damages by the cost of com-
pletion in accordance with the contract would have defeated the
purpose that the court was trying to serve. It would have resulted
in a judgment for the cost of total rebuilding. "In the circum-
stances of this case, we think that the measure of the allowance is
not the cost of replacement which would be great, but the differ-
ence in value, which would be either nominal or nothing. . .. The
rule that gives a remedy in cases of substantial performance with
compensation for defects of trivial or inappreciable impor-
tance has been developed by the courts as an instrument of jus-
tice. The measure of the allowance must be shaped to the same
end."
Conditions precedent to a contractor's duty to render his prom-
ised performance can be voluntarily " waived" by him; or, his
conduct may be such, when relied upon by the other party, that he
is "estopped" from using the nonperformance of the condition
as a defense. Such waiver and estoppel are often available in
HARV. 42371 COL. YALE 441
MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO
suits on insurance policies; 22 knowledge of the facts by the com-
pany's agents will sometimes be imputed to the company - it can
have knowledge in no other manner.
And even though an agent has promised not to enter into deals
without the employer's assent and has agreed further that there
shall be no waiver or alteration except by a signed writing, this
does not deprive the employer of power to waive by oral assent.
" Those who make a contract may unmake it. The clause which
forbids a change may be changed like any other. The prohibition
of oral waiver may itself be waived. . . . What is excluded by
one act is restored by another. You may put it out by the door;
it is back through the window. Whenever two men contract, no
limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to contract
again." 23
JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR BREACH
It is the availability of judicial remedies that gives effectiveness
to the system of contract law. Agreements may be better than
the law of contract, for habit and the mores of honor often lead to
performance when the law does not require it; but the law of con-
tract is no better than its remedies, for it is by applying remedies
that " law " is created. The body of the law - its flesh and blood
and bones - consists of the sum-total of its judgments, decrees,
and executions. These can be organized into a system by reason
22 Good health of the insured at the date of execution of the policy does not
remain a condition of the insurer's duty, when its agents took the application and
received the premiums from the insured while in a hospital. Bible v. John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 256 N. Y. 458, 176 N. E. 838 (931). A promise to "waive the
forfeiture" on certain conditions, made after the forfeiture is already complete, be-
comes enforceable after fulfillment of the conditions by the insured. And "satisfac-
tory evidence of insurability" means evidence that would satisfy reasonable men.
Thompson v. Postal Life Ins. Co., 226 N. Y. 363, 123 N. E. 750 (2929). But when
a forfeited policy is " reinstated" in reliance on a false statement fraudulently made,
knowledge of the facts by a local agent was not a "waiver" and did not prevent the
policy from being voidable. "False representations and broken warranties are not so
easily repaired." McCormack v. Security Mut. Life Ins. Co., 22o N.Y. 447, 456, ii6
N. E. 74, 77 (1917). The time fixed for performance by one party ceases to be " of
the essence" if the other party gives such an oral assurance or permits the delayed
performance to continue. Brede v. Rosedale Terrace Co., 216 N. Y. 246, iio N. E.
430 (1915); Holden v. Efficient Craftsman Corp., 234 N. Y. 437, 138 N. E. 85 (1923),
23 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (1919).
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of the uniformity that exists in high degree, by reason of the fact
that precedent follows precedent. Without some degree of uni-
formity in the application of remedies, we could neither state nor
CC restate" a system of law- a book full of rules and principles
and doctrines and standards.
If a great jurist has to deal constructively with those factors
that must exist before a remedy is available -with such matters
as assent and consideration and conditions precedent - so also
must he deal with the choice of remedy that is granted, with the
measurement of damages, the limitations on specific enforcement,
the meaning and extent of restitution.
Cardozo's work in these fields is of a piece with his work in the
others. Against one who is guilty of a breach of contract, what are
the limits of recovery? Must he pay for all the harms that are
subsequent to his wrong, regardless of time and space? It is easy
to say that relief is limited to compensation for harm caused by the
breach; but causation is a mystery, and compensation is possible
only in accordance with that elusive variable called valuation. For
a practical working rule with which to start, Cardozo is content,
like other judges, with the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale - a rule
derived directly from the French, and doubtless indirectly from
much earlier sources. He knows that it is not perfection, and that
it does not give an automatic answer. But it served to keep awire-
less company from having to pay $6,675 to a plaintiff who would
have earned that much as freight had his code message been sent
to Manila..2 ' The company could not translate the code and could
foresee nothing of the loss of business. Cardozo respects prece-
dent and applies the rule. He writes: "We are not unmindful of
the force of the plaintiff's assault upon the rule in Hadley v.
Baxendale in its application to the relation between telegraph
carrier and customer. The truth seems to be that neither the
clerk who receives the message over the counter nor the operator
who transmits it nor any other employee gives or is expected to
give any thought to the sense of what he is receiving or transmit-
ting. This imparts to the whole doctrine as to the need for notice
21 Kerr Steamship Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245 N. Y. 284, 57 N. E. 140
(1927).
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an air of unreality. The doctrine, however, has prevailed for
years so many that it is tantamount to a rule of property."
The value of the promised performance and of the harm suf-
fered must be proved with some reasonable degree of accuracy; "I
but this does not mean mathematical exactness or certainty. In
the rare case in which a master sues his servant for abandonment,
the measure is the value of the promised service less the agreed
wages that are saved to the master; and the terms of a new contract
made by the servant with another master are evidence of value
sufficient to justify a substantial verdict.2 1 Interest may be al-
lowed as damages, even where the claim was unliquidated; but if
the full amount demanded by the claimant is allowed by the court,
the interest may run from date of the demand, while if the claim
was excessive, interest runs only from the date of bringing suit."
Is there a " duty" on the injured party to avoid loss and miti-
gate damages? No, replies Cardozo, in an action by servant
against master for wrongful discharge." " The final question is
this: Does a servant's refusal to accept other employment amount
to an extinguishment of liability for damage actually suffered, or
to disproof of the claim that damage to the extent demanded was
actually suffered? Plainly, I think, the latter. . . . The obliga-
tion of the master is merely to pay whatever damages have actu-
ally been suffered, and these exclude damages that a servant, act-
ing reasonably, would have diminished or avoided. . . . The
statement is not infrequently made in treatise and decision that a
25 Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N. Y. I04, 122 N. E. 756
(i919). Damages for failure to supply "first run" feature pictures to a theater
cannot be awarded on a mere showing that the receipts from " first run" pictures
are better than those from "second run." "The difference, however, was not con-
stant, or even approximately constant. It was subject to the widest fluctuation.
Quality counts, it seems, with pictures as with plays. . . . In this business, as in
others, there are times when merit triumphs over novelty." Id. at ioS, 12 N. B. at
757.
26 Triangle Waist Co. v. Todd, 223 N. Y. 27, ri9 N. E. 85 (1918).
27 Prager v. New Jersey Fidelity & P. G. Ins. Co., 245 N. Y. 2, 156 N. B. 76
(1927). Of course, other variations in the allowance of interest are permitted to the
courts.
28 McClelIand v. Climax Hosiery Mills, 252 N. Y. 347, 354, 169 N. E. 6o5, 6os
(1930) (concurring opinion).
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servant wrongfully discharged is ' under a duty ' to the master to
reduce damages, if he can. The phrase is accurate enough for
most purposes, yet susceptible of misunderstanding, if empha-
sized too sharply (A. L. I. Contracts Restatement, Sec. 336). The
servant is free to accept employment or reject it according to his
uncensored pleasure. What is meant by the supposed duty is
merely this, that if he unreasonably reject, he will not be heard to
say that the loss of wages from then on shall be deemed the jural
consequence of the earlier discharge. He has broken the chain
of causation, and the loss resulting thereafter is suffered through
his own act."
The law of specific enforcement is only slightly touched in
Cardozo's opinions, although with a sure hand and with results
open to no criticism. 29 The cases are more numerous in which
the remedy of restitution is considered - restitution as an alterna-
tive remedy for breach of contract,"0 or for fraud 1 or mistake 1.
connected therewith. A plaintiff who asks for restitution instead
of damages is treated as having rescinded the contract; and if he
has received a part performance of value he must restore it, or its
value if it has any. This does not mean that the plaintiff must
restore what others, who conspired with the defendant in the
fraud, have received. "The refusal of the conspirators to join in
the undoing of the wrong may not be used as an excuse by partners
in their guilt to keep the wrong alive. Equity is not crippled at
such times by an inexorable formula. In exacting the return of
29 Two cases of interest are: Catholic Foreign Mission Soc. v. Oussani, 215 X. Y.
i, log N. E. So (1915) (specific performance will not be refused for lack of mutuality
of remedy where the plaintiff waives the condition that had previously made that
remedy unavailable against himself); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Mortimer, 2x9
N. Y. 290, 114 N. E. 389 (i916) (specific enforcement refused because of the interests
of third persons).
30 Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N. Y. 346, 152 N. E. 11o (1926) (a bank failing
to deliver Polish marks in Warsaw must repay the dollars paid for its promise in Nev,
York).
31 Marr v. Tumulty, 256 N. Y. i5, 175 N. E. 356 (1931); Schank v. Schuchman,
212 N. Y. 352, Io6 N. E. 127 (1914) ; New 'ork Bankers, Inc. v. Duncan, 257 N. Y.
i6o, 177 N. E. 407 (1931).
32 Wayne County Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 244 N. Y. 35x, 155 N. E. 669
(1927).
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benefits as a condition of rescission it proportions the exaction to
the justice of the case before it." "
The remedy of restitution is sometimes described as quasi-con-
tractual, and it is said to be based on equity and good conscience.
But talk of "equity and good conscience" in a suit for "rescis-
sion " does not prove that the remedy was originally in equity
rather than at common law. "The semblance of an action in
equity rather than one at law has thus been given to their plead-
ing. We speak of its form in that regard as a semblance, for we
think it is nothing more." The relief asked was nothing more
than money back. 4
Further, calling the remedy quasi-contractual does not discon-
nect it with the contract. Where an artist died before completion
of his personal service contract, his executrix was held to have a
right to reasonable value of work done. The contract itself plays
a large part in determining the amount of this recovery, even
though it made no provision for the event of death. "The award
will then conform to the principles of liability in quasi-contract
and to the considerations of equity and justice by which that lia-
bility is governed. In either event the controversy is one that has
its origin in the contract and in the performance of the work there-
under, just as much as if the work had been completed under a
contract silent as to price, and the controversy had relation to the
reasonable value. Death of the contractor has not nullified the
contract in the sense of emancipating the claimant from the re-
straint of its conditions. They limit her at every turn. She can-
not stir a step without reference to the contract, nor profit by a
dollar without adherence to its covenants. The interrupted work
may have been better than any called for by the plans. Even so,
there can be no recovery if the contractor wilfully and without ex-
cuse has substituted something else. The value proportionately
distributed may be greater than the contract price. Even so, the
price, and not the value, will be the maximum beyond which the
judgment may not go. 'The recovery in such a case cannot ex-
ceed the contract price, or the rate of it for the part of the service
33 Marr v. Tumulty, 256 N. Y. 15, 21, 175 N. E. 356, 357 (1931).
34 Schank v. Schuchman, 212 N. Y. 352, 356, io6 N. E. 127, 128 (1914).
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performed.' The question to be determined is not the value of the
work considered by itself and unrelated to the contract. The
question to be determined is the benefit to the owner in advance-
ment of the ends to be promoted by the contract." 11
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
The judgment or decree of a court is a judicial remedy. What
shall we say of the award of an arbitrator? It, too, is a judicial
remedy of a kind. An arbitrator is a judge in a dispute - indeed,
he is both judge and jury. But he is one who is appointed by the
litigating parties, or in a manner on which they have agreed; and
he is appointed to serve for the one litigation only. He is not a
public official whose power and duty it is to serve all comers. The
ordinary litigant must take his chances before a public officer,
chosen by others long in advance and without reference to a spe-
cific case. One who submits his case to an arbitrator selects his
own judge; and he selects one, if he can induce the other party to
agree, who is most likely to be prejudiced in his own favor.
If two parties agree to take their chances before an arbiter so
selected, does the public interest require us to refuse the enforce-
ment of that agreement? It has never been regarded as against
public policy for two parties to agree, after a dispute has arisen, to
submit that dispute to a private arbiter and to promise to abide by
his decision. The judicial remedies available for the enforcement
of such an agreement, however, were not very effective. The
amount of harm caused by one party's refusal to arbitrate is al-
ways too uncertain and difficult of proof to make a judgment for
damages effective; and the courts of equity were unwilling to try
to enforce the agreement specifically. Nevertheless, if the arbiter
was duly appointed, gave a fair hearing and rendered an award,
that award was conclusive and was enforceable in the courts.
On the other hand, for reasons not wholly free from obscurity
and uncertainty, the courts held that an agreement by two parties,
made on entering into a transaction and before any dispute has
5 In re Buccni v. Paterno ConstL Co., 253 N. Y. 256, 258, 17o N. E. go, 9r
(193o).
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arisen, that they will submit all disputes thereafter arising to arbi-
tration, to the exclusion of the courts, is contrary to public policy
and void. It may be observed here that if one of the parties to
such a contract has greater economic or mental bargaining power
than the other, he gets a double advantage therefrom, the advan-
tage of favorable terms and the advantage of a favorable judge.
This will be illustrated by the first case of the kind that came
before Cardozo.
An attempt, previously successful in the English courts, was
made to avoid the effect of this doctrine of public policy. The
advance agreement providing for the arbitration of all future dis-
putes was drafted so as to declare that it was not intended to
"oust the courts of jurisdiction," but only to determine the sub-
stantive rights of the parties. It was provided that if a dispute
should thereafter arise, neither party should have an enforceable
right until after arbitration was held as agreed and an award ren-
dered. This made an award a condition precedent to any right of
action. Surely the law recognizes freedom of contract and the
power of two contracting parties to control their substantive rights
and duties, even though they cannot control judicial remedies or
deprive the courts of jurisdiction over the enforcement of rights
and duties after they come into existence. In case of dispute, the
only right that either party has is a right to the performance of an
award after it shall be rendered. As soon as such a right is born,
let the courts enforce it by such remedies as they will. Before
the award, there is no right or duty for the courts, or anybody
else, to enforce. Such was the argument; and its cogency was
supported by the fact that many had doubts that any arbitration
agreement was contrary to public policy.
Within Cardozo's first year on the bench, a contract providing
in advance for general arbitration came before him." A railroad
construction contract made the chief engineer of the railroad com-
pany" arbitrator to decide all matters in dispute arising out of the
contract . . . and each party hereby waives all right of action,
suit or suits or other remedy . . . to enforce any claim except as
the same shall have been determined by said arbitrator." The trial
36 Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & G. R. R., 211 N. Y. 346, ioS N. E. 653 (1914).
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court held this contract valid and that no action would lie before
an award, for the reason that the award of the engineer was made
a condition precedent to any right of action. The opinion of the
Court of Appeals, written by Judge Hogan, did not refer to this
reason, but it held that the agreement attempted to oust the courts
of jurisdiction and was against public policy and void.
Cardozo appears to have had no doubts as to the correctness of
the decision, but he thought that the court should express its disap-
proval of the condition precedent argument. In a concurring opin-
ion, he says: " If an agreement that a foreign court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction is to be condemned, it is not saved by a
declaration that resort to the foreign court shall be deemed a con-
dition precedent to the accrual of a cause of action. A rule would
not long survive if it were subject to be avoided by so facile a de-
vice. Such a contract, whatever form it may assume, affects in its
operation the remedy alone. . . . If any exceptions to the gen-
eral rule are to be admitted, we ought not to extend them to a con-
tract where the exclusive jurisdiction has been bestowed, not on
the regular courts of another sovereignty, but on private arbi-
trators. Whether the attempt to bring about this result takes the
form of a condition precedent or a covenant, it is equally inef-
fective."
Not many years later, the New York Legislature passed the ar-
bitration statute that nullifies this decision, making arbitration
agreements valid and enforceable, whether general or limited in
scope and whether in form of condition precedent or covenant. It
provides for a court order suspending any action until the arbitra-
tion agreed on shall be held.
Soon, another arbitration case came before Cardozo and his
court.s The new arbitration statute was held constitutional and
37 There may be error in this statement that such a contract "affects in its
operation the remedy alone "; but there is no doubt that it affects remedy, in addi-
tion to the rights for which remedies exist. But if A contracts to pay, for construc-
tion work done by B, the amount of money at which C shall appraise the work done,
the appraisal by C is a condition precedent to A's right to payment. Under the con-
tract, there is no right in B and no duty in A requiring the payment of any money
before C appraises; and after his appraisal, the only right is a right to the payment
of the sum so fixed. Surely, this affects the right as well as the remedy.
s In re Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, 23o N.Y. 26r, 13o N. E. 288 (i92x).
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valid. When it was argued that the statute impairs the obligation
of a contract, Cardozo retorted: "There is no merit in the conten-
tion. The obligation of the contract is strengthened, not im-
paired." He held that the statute affects remedies, not substantive
rights, notwithstanding their inseparable nature; the statute is
therefore applicable to. contracts made before the statute was
passed, although it will not be applied to nullify results already
reached in existing litigation.
It was argued that the statute ousted the courts of jurisdiction,
contrary to the state constitution. He replied: "Jurisdiction exists
that rights may be maintained. Rights are not maintained that
jurisdiction may exist. The People, in establishing a Supreme
Court to administer the law, did not petrify the law which the court
is to administer." He finds no deprivation of jurisdiction, since
the court is now merely required to enforce a contract as made,
instead of setting it aside. Cardozo makes no critical reference to
the Meacham decision, but he pays scant respect to the notions of
public policy on which that decision was founded. "The ancient
rule, with its exceptions and refinements, was criticized by many
judges as anomalous and unjust. It was followed with frequent
protest, in deference to early precedents. Its hold even upon the
common law was hesitating and feeble. We are now asked to de-
clare it so imbedded in the very foundations of our jurisprudence
and the structure of our courts that nothing less than an amend-
ment of the Constitution is competent to change it. We will not
go so far. The judges might have changed the rule themselves if
they had abandoned some early precedents, as at times they
seemed inclined to do. They might have whittled it down to noth-
ing, as was done indeed in England, by distinctions between prom-
ises that are collateral and those that are conditions. No one
would have suspected that in so doing they were undermining a
jurisdiction which the Constitution had charged them with a duty
to preserve. Not different is the effect of like changes when
wrought by legislation."
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. AND PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
Cardozo found ample opportunity to display his instinct for
justice, and his skill and common sense as an interpreter, in deal-
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ing with cases involving the Statute of Frauds and the parol evi-
dence rule. The Statute itself is content with" some note or memo-
randum" of the contract; so is Cardozo. The memorandum must
indeed be signed " and it must truly represent the agreement in
fact made; 40 but if liberality of interpretation and implication is
permitted in the case of written contracts, even more should be
permitted in case of a" note or memorandum."
In settling a disagreement, the defendant signed a writing to the
effect that "the arrangements made for employment of Mlarks in
our business ...continue in force until Jan. I, 1916." Salary
was stated; but nothing was said as to the service to be rendered
by Marks. This was held to be a sufficient memorandum of the
contract to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. It purports" to continue
an existing employment. What that employment was can be
shown by oral evidence of the actual performances, as well as by
previous writings, even though not referred to. "In thus identify-
ing the position we are not importing into the contract a new ele-
ment of promise. We are turning signs and symbols into their
equivalent realities. This must always be done to some extent, no
matter how many are the identifying tokens. ' In every case, the
words must be translated into things and facts by parol evidence.'
How far the process may be extended is a question of degree. We
exclude the writing that refers us to spoken words of promise. We
admit the one that bids us ascertain a place or a relation by com-
parison of the description with some ' manifest, external, and con-
tinuing fact.' The statute must not be pressed to the extreme of a
literal and rigid logic. Some compromise is inevitable if words are
to fulfil their function as symbols of things and of ideas. How
many identifying tokens we are to exact, the reason and common
sense of the situation must tell us." "' Hence, it was held that the
9 Mesibov, Glinert & Levy v. Cohen Bros. BMg. Co., 245 N. Y. 305, 157 N. E.
148 (1927) (printed name at top of an order blank held not to be a signature).
40 N. E. D. Holding Co. v. McKinley, 246 N. Y. 40, 157 N. E. 923 (927). A
signed memorandum was on a stereotyped form, with some of the blanks unfilled.
No time was stated for conveyance or for the final payment. The court was willing
to supply these gaps by making inferences, in the absence of a showing that the
parties otherwise expressly agreed. "The parties evidently thought they were bound,
for they described the writing as a binder. We are not to strain for a construction
that will defeat their expectation." Id. at 44, x57 N. E. at 924.
41 Marks v. Cowdin, 226 N. Y. 138, 143, 123 N. E. 139, 141 (1919).
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plaintiff could introduce evidence of the service that he had pre-
viously been performing, that he had been in fact" sales-manager"
with definite powers and duties.
A contract that is. required to be in writing by the Statute, and is
in writing, may be modified by a subsequent oral agreement, if the
contract as thus modified is one that the Statute does not require
to be in writing.4 °2 If the contract as orally modified is one that is
within the Statute, it is not enforceable by action; yet if it is reason-
ably relied on by the plaintiff, a vendor, so that he delays in clear-
ing his title as required by the written contract, the purchaser is not
justified in repudiating the contract by reason of that delay. He
is estopped from taking advantage of a nonperformance of con-
dition that he himself induced by making the oral agreement. In a
concurring opinion, Cardozo writes: "The principle is fundamen-
tal and unquestioned. Sometimes the resulting disability has been
characterized as an estoppel, sometimes as a waiver. We need not
go into the question of the accuracy of the description. The truth
is that we are facing a principle more nearly ultimate than either
waiver or estoppel, one with roots in the yet larger principle that
no one shall be permitted to found any claim upon his own inequity
or take advantage of his own wrong. The Statute of Frauds was
not intended to offer an asylum of escape from that fundamental
principle of justice." "
In a case dealing with the "part performance" doctrine, 4 Car-
dozo shows his willingness to adhere to existing New York prec-
42 Lieberman v. Templar Motor Co., 236 N. Y. 139, 14o N. E. 222 (1923). A
written contract that could not be performed within one year was modified orally at
a time when the modified contract could be performed within one year. Many courts
have carelessly said the contrary.
43 Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N. Y. 447, 457, 127 N.E. 263,266 (i92o).
44 Burns v. McCormick, 233 N. Y. 230, 135 N. E. 273 (1922). Thils follows
Maddison v. Alderson, 8 App. Cas. 467 (1833), and the decision, on the exact facts
of the case, is in harmony with RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 197. There are
many cases in other states that are contra. A judgment for the reasonable value of
his services was available to the plaintiff; and it was probably not a seriously inade-
quate remedy, for the reason that the plaintiff's change of position was not very
great. Even so, Cardozo should have given critical thought to the doctrine that the
part performance must be "solely and unequivocally referable" to the contract
sought to be enforced. That doctrine is practically unworkable. Competent scholars
generally disapprove it, and the American Law Institute does not adopt it.
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edents and to accept the policy of the Statute as declared by the
legislature. At the request of an old man, the plaintiff gave up a
small business, moved to the promisor's home, and there cared for
him until he died - all in reliance on the old man's oral promise to
leave the land to the plaintiff at death. It was held that this was
not such" part performance" as made the oral promise specifically
enforceable. The court says: " We hold, then, that the acts of
part performance are not solely and unequivocally referable to a
contract for the sale of land. . . . We do not ignore decisions to
the contrary in other jurisdictions. They are not law for us. In-
adequacy of legal remedies, without more, does not dispense with
the requirement that acts, not words, shall supply the framework
of the promise. . . . The peril of perjury and error is latent in
the spoken promise. Such, at least, is the warning of the Statute,
the estimate of policy that finds expression in its mandate. Equity,
in assuming what is in substance a dispensing power, does not
treat the Statute as irrelevant, nor ignore the warning altogether.
It declines to act on words, though the legal remedy is imperfect,
unless the words are confirmed by deeds. A power of dispensation,
departing from the letter in supposed adherence to the spirit, in-
volves an assumption of jurisdiction easily abused, and justified
only within the limits imposed by history and precedent. The
power is not exercised unless the policy of the law is saved." "
The "parol evidence rule " represents an effort by the courts to
attain the same general purpose underlying the Statute of Frauds
- the prevention of successful fraud and perjury. The Statute
attempts to attain that purpose by declaring that certain oral con-
tracts shall not be enforceable by action; the parol evidence rule,
by declaring that a contract, when once integrated in writing, shall
not be varied or contradicted by testimony of antecedent oral
agreements and understandings. Both the Statute and the rule, if
they attain their end at all, attain it at heavy cost to many honest
men; they prevent the enforcement of many agreements that were
in fact made, and sometimes cause the enforcement of an agreement
that was not in fact made. Such a result as this was certainly not
within the purpose of either the Statute or the rule; and in innu-
4 233 N. Y. at 234, 135 N. E. at 274.
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merable cases the courts have avoided such a result by manhan-
dling both. Read a thousand cases in which oral contracts have
been held to be enforceable by devices said to take them "out of
the Statute," and that legislative act takes on the aspect of a living
skeleton. Read a like number of cases in which oral testimony has
been admitted to vary and explain writings, and the parol evidence
rule assumes the semblance of a ghostly fiction. Yet at other times,
both are vigorously supported and are applied with apparent dis-
regard of the merits of the specific case.
In such of Cardozo's opinions as might involve the parol evi-
dence rule, he does not actually apply it. He welcomes and re-
quires the admission of oral testimony as to the antecedent negotia-
tions and surrounding facts, in order to aid him in determining the
expressed intent of the parties, what they in fact said and what its
meaning. Often he is willing to leave the issues to the jury.4 " Of
course, the meaning that will determine legal effect is that which is
arrived at by objective standards; one is bound, not by what he sub-
jectively intends, but by what he leads others reasonably to think
that he intends. 7 But in finding this meaning, evidence should
be admitted with great liberality to aid the court and jury in under-
standing and interpreting; 48 evidence should be admitted "show-
ing forth the transaction in all its length and breadth."
46 See Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N. Y. 332, 146 N. E. 6x8 (1925); Loomis v. New
York C. & H. R. R. R., 214 N. Y. 447, io8 N. E. 837 (x915).
47 U. S. Rubber Co. v. Silverstein, 229 N. Y. x68, 128 N. E. 123 (i92o). "Tho
promise, if uncertain, was to be taken in the sense 'in which the promisor had reason
to suppose it was understood by the promisee.'" Id. at 171, 128 N. E. at 124.
48 See Utica City Nat. Bank v. Gunn, 222 N. Y. 204, 208, it8 N. E. 6o7, 6o8
(1918), holding that a written guaranty, couched in words that seemed to make It
applicable only to new loans made thereafter, was shown by evidence of extrinlc
facts to be applicable to an existing loan and to renewals thereof. It was a four-to-
three decision; and Cardozo admits that the strict legal meaning of the words would
cover only future loans and discounts. He says: "The proper legal meaning, how-
ever, is not always the meaning of the parties. Surrounding circumstance,: may
stamp upon a contract a popular and looser meaning .... To take the primary or
strict meaning is to make the whole transaction futile. To take the secondary
or loose meaning is to give it efficacy and purpose. In such a situation, the genesls
and aim of the transaction may rightly guide our choice. . . .Verbal niceties might
yield in their minds [the "triers of the facts "] to the overmastering consideration
that unless related to past loans, the obligation of the bond was a vain and empty
form. It is easier to give a new shade of meaning to a word than to give no meaning
to a whole transaction."
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The words last quoted are from a very interesting case4 Both
parties asserted that a contract had been consummated; but they
disagreed as to its terms. A written document had been executed
by both parties, providing for amounts and prices of labor and ma-
terials, but somewhat cryptic in form. The trial judge ruled that
this document was as matter of law a contract, and excluded all
conversations at the time of signing and before. He held for the
plaintiff, leaving only the assessment of damages to the jury. The
Appellate Division ruled that as matter of law there was no contract
and dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals held that both lower courts were in error.
Having considered the document, the pleadings, and the oral and
written testimony, Cardozo held that it was not for the court to
decide, as " matter of law," either that the transaction had never
passed beyond the stage of preliminary negotiation, or that the
document in evidence constituted a final and complete integration
of the agreement. That decision must be made as one of fact, after
admitting all relevant testimony " showing forth the transaction in
all its length and breadth." This testimony might show that the
delivery of the document had been subject to some extrinsic condi-
tion; also that some related matters had been reserved by the
parties for future consideration. There may have been no con-
tract; there may have been a contract partly oral and partly in
writing; there may have been a fully integrated written contract.
As one of these alternatives, the jury might adopt the third and
find that there was a written integration, complete and final in
every respect; but they can so find only after hearing and weigh-
ing a mass of conflicting parol testimony. If they so find, it would
seem that this written integration makes inadmissible the very
testimony that the jury had to weigh in order to determine the
character of the document that made it admissible.
THE CC JUDIcIAL PROcESS " OF CARDozo
The work of Cardozo in contract cases does not demonstrate
the existence of very unusual ability in the analysis of complex
problems and transactions. His great strength is demonstrated as
49 Saltzman v. Barson, 239 N. Y. 332, 336, 146 N. E. 6x8, 61g (192S).
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an interpreter of human conduct and expression and as a minister of
justice. Being blest with an understanding of the purposes of
contractors, he translates their defective words and symbols into
a language that is clear to all. Blest with a familiarity with the
literature of the law, he makes the happiest use of it. Blest with
an understanding of human justice, its expression in judicial opin-
ions, and its basis in the prevailing but sometimes changing mores
and practices of men, he leads his court so as to administer that
justice, never letting traditional dogma or commonly-stated doc-
trine block its attainment. Thus he molds doctrine without re-
pudiating it. In his judicial process, Cardozo draws from the very
wellsprings and fountainheads, and pours forth the living draught
in a liquid style that sparkles with his own incomparable charm
and personality.
All this does not mean that Cardozo is building a new system of
contract law. No one knows better than he that even a Cardozo
can do no such thing."0 He is making an existing system work
50 In this article it has not been attempted to consider all of the cases in which
Cardozo wrote an opinion. The New York law of third-party bencficiarle is long,
complicated, and inconsistent. Cardozo's opinions do not go far toward making it
less so. See the following cases: American Ex. Nat. Bank v. Goubert, 2io N. Y.
421, 104 N. E. 928 (1914) (holding a bond to be one for the indemnity of the
promisee alone); Farnsworth v. Boro Oil & Gas Co., 226 N. Y. 40, io9 N. E. 86o
(x915) (enforcing, in a suit by a citizen, a promise made to his town by a public
service corporation); Kottler v. New York Bargain House, 242 N. Y. 28, 150
N. E. 591 (1926) (landlord can enforce a promise to pay the rent made by the original
tenant's assignee); Weatherwax v. Royal Indemnity Co., 250 N. Y. 281, 165 N. E.
293 (1929), and Rushing v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 251 N. Y. 302, 167 N. B.
450 (1929) (holding the beneficiary's right to be conditional as was the right of the
promisee); Fosmire v. National Surety Co., 229 N. Y. 44, 127 N. E. 472 (1920)
(denying, on somewhat debatable grounds, that a laborer can maintain suit on a
contractor's surety bond expressly conditioned on payment of laborers). This last
case was later distinguished and limited by Cardozo in Johnson Service Co. v.
Monin, 253 N. Y. 417, 171 N. E. 692 (1930), and in Strong v. American Fence Const,
Co., 245 N. Y. 48, x16 N. E. 92 (2928).
Two cases dealing with the law of accord and satisfaction are worthy of special
note. In Gaston & Co. v. Storch, 253 N. Y. 68, 27o N. E. 496 (1930), a claimant
cashed a check stated on its face to be "in full settlement." This did not exclude
testimony of the actual oral agreement on which it was tendered and received. In
Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., 258 N. Y. 168, 179 N. E. 373 (1932), Cardozo decided
that where money was held in trust, no accord and satisfaction would result from
the acceptance by the claimant of a part of the fund, tendered by the trustee as a
full settlement, after deducting the amount of his disputed claim for services rendered.
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well in new cases as they arise. He is taking the past, indeed well-
learned and well-respected, and molding it to serve the ends that
it has always served. It is true that he does not leave it unaf-
fected and unchanged in the process. So it has always been with
other judges, great and small. Such is indeed the Nature of the
Judicial Process.
In this process, are the judges breaking down an existing cer-
tainty of law and destroying the advising lawyer's golden dream of
intellectual repose? Let us permit the great jurist to speak for
himself. "I was much troubled in spirit, in my first years upon
the bench, to find how trackless was the ocean on which I had em-
barked. I sought for certainty. I was oppressed and disheartened
when I found that the quest for it was futile. I was trying to reach
land, the solid land of fixed and settled rules, the paradise of a
justice that would declare itself by tokens plainer and more com-
manding than its pale and glimmering reflections in my own vacil-
lating mind and conscience. I found' with the voyagers in Brown-
ing's "Paracelsus " that the real heaven was always beyond.' As
the years have gone by, and as I have reflected more and more
upon the nature of the judicial process, I have become reconciled
to the uncertainty, because I have grown to see it as inevitable. I
have grown to see that the process in its highest reaches is not
discovery, but creation; and that the doubts and misgivings, the
hopes and fears, are part of the travail of mind, the pangs of death
and the pangs of birth, in which principles that have served their
day expire, and new principles are born." "
Arthur L. Corbin.
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